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It is a folklore that some attacks on compression functions do not
weaken hash functions.
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It is a folklore that some attacks on compression functions do not
weaken hash functions.
When can we say that even after doing some strong attack on the
compression function, the above belief on the hash function
security would still hold?
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On some SHA3 hash functions
1 Nearly all SHA3 designers who have had distinguishers,
symmetries, fixed points, partial fixed point etc.. sort of
analysis on their compression functions claimed that they do
not lead to attacks on hash functions.
2 Some designers (e.g SIMD, SHABAL) even proved the
indifferentiability security of their hash function when the
compression function has efficient distinguishers.
Are these hash functions still indifferentiable if their compression
functions are easily invertible (pseudo preimage attacks)?
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On some SHA3 hash functions
1 Nearly all SHA3 designers who have had distinguishers,
symmetries, fixed points, partial fixed point etc.. sort of
analysis on their compression functions claimed that they do
not lead to attacks on hash functions.
2 Some designers (e.g SIMD, SHABAL) even proved the
indifferentiability security of their hash function when the
compression function has efficient distinguishers.
Are these hash functions still indifferentiable if their compression
functions are easily invertible (pseudo preimage attacks)?
Many second round SHA3 hash functions use a wide-pipe or a
pfMD or their special instantiation for the iteration.
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Wide-pipe and pfMD
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Invertible queries to compression functions
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Strong inversion queries
[Liskov-SAC’06,Hoch-Shamir-ICALP’08]
[We consider]
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Indifferentiability results
Mode pfMD wide pipe
Bridging no no
Strong backward no yes* [SHABAL team]
Weak backward yes yes* [SHABAL team]
1 Generalisation of indifferentiability of Sponge hash
construction[Bertoni et al.-Eurocrypt’08].
2 Wide-pipe of a weak compression function such as Rabin’s 78
scheme seems to remain indifferentiable [SHABAL team].
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Thank you!!!!
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